INTRODUCTION
I begin by sharing a bit about my past. Before I became a professor, I spent 13 years as a lawyer representing persons with mental disabilities, including three years in which my focus was primarily on such individuals charged with crime. In this role, when I was Deputy Public Defender in Mercer County (Trenton) NJ, I represented several hundred individuals at the maximum security hospital for the criminally insane in New Jersey, both in individual cases, and in a class action that implemented the then-recent US Supreme Court case of Jackson v Indiana, 2 that had declared unconstitutional state policy that allowed for the indefinite commitment of pre-trial detainees in maximum security forensic facilities if it were unlikely he would regain his capacity to stand trial in the 'foreseeable future.' 3 I continued to represent this population for a decade in my later positions as Director of the NJ Division of Mental Health Advocacy and Special Counsel to the NJ Public Advocate. Also, as a Public Defender, I represented at trial many defendants who were incompetent to stand trial, and others who, although competent, pled not guilty by reason of insanity. 4 Finally, during the time that I directed the Federal Litigation Clinic at New York Law School, I filed a brief on behalf of appellant in Ake v Oklahoma, 5 on the right of an indigent defendant to an independent psychiatrist to aid in the presentation of an insanity defence. 6 I have appeared in courts at every level from police court to the US Supreme Court, in the latter 'second-seating' Strickland v Washington. 7 I raise all this not to offer a short form of my biography, but to underscore that this article draws on my experiences of years in trial courts and appellate courts as well as from decades of teaching courtrooms -where contemporaneous understandings of mental illness and its relationship to criminal behaviour are ignored, and where we repeat myths and shibboleths from the early 19h century1 -are, in fact, museums of the past. There is no place for nuance; rather, the 'infinite' permutations that exist when people with mental disabilities commit inexplicable otherwisecriminal acts is utterly ignored.
Writing some years ago about neonaticide cases, I said we 'impose a dyadic straightjacket on neonaticidal defendants. They are either crazy or they are evil.' 19 So it is with all defendants with mental disabilities in the criminal process. Like 'infinity' in Dylan's lyric, our entire criminal justice system 'goes up on trial.'
To a great extent, my interest in sanism and pretextuality began at two separate points in time, both in the 1970s, many years before I had heard of or thought of either word. As a 'rookie' Public Defender in Trenton, New Jersey, I often filed motions to suppress evidence on behalf of my clients in criminal cases, arguing that the police behaviour in seizing contraband (usually small amounts of 'street drugs') violated the Fourth Amendment's ban on 'unreasonable searches and seizures.' In almost all of these cases, the arresting officer's testimony was basically the same: he would testify that, when my client saw him coming, my client made a 'furtive gesture,' and then reached into his pocket, took out a glassine envelope (filled with the illegal drug), and threw it on the ground, blurting out, 'That's heroin [or whatever], and it's mine.' My client -not surprisinglytold a different story: that the policeman approached him, stuck his hands into my client's pockets, pulled out the glassine envelope, and then placed my client under arrest. 20 1 self-consciously begin with this auto-biographical information as I think it creates the mise en scene that is necessary for this article to make sense to those unfamiliar with the underlying issues. 21 This body of law, in the US, flows from the US Supreme Court decision in Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961), mandating the suppression of illegally-seized evidence. 22 Perlin, 'Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth', above n 10, 6.
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I had no doubt that my client was telling the truth. I suspected that the judge and the prosecutor had the same intuition. Yet, in such 'dropsy' cases, the judge invariably found the police officer to be more credible and would thus rule that the search came within the 'plain view' exception of search and seizure law, upholding the search. It was no surprise to me years later when I read Myron Orfield's article (studying 'dropsy' cases in Chicago), reporting that eighty-six per cent of judges, public defenders and prosecutors questioned (including seventy-seven per cent of judges) believed that police officers fabricate evidence in ca se reports at least 'some of the time,' and that a staggering ninety-two per cent (including ninety-one per cent of judges) believe that police officers lie in court to avoid suppression of evidence at least 'some of the time.
2 3 Although I did not know it at the time, this was my first introduction to pretextuality in law.
My second introduction followed soon after, and involved questions of mental disability law. Again, as the 'rookie' Public Defender, I was assigned to represent individuals at the Vroom Building, New Jersey's maximum security facility for the 'criminally insane,' on their applications for writs of habeas corpus (the reason I came to file the class action so as to implement Jackson v Indiana). The cases were -to be charitable -charades. The attorney-general asked the hospital doctor two questions: was the patient mentally ill, and did he need treatment? The answers always were 'yes,' and the writs were denied. as it has until we come to grips with the pernicious power of these two factors.
These factors cause us to make, and to reinforce, biased and irrational judgments, and doom us to repeat the errors that we continue to make in the way we deal with questions that relate to the representation of criminal defendants with mental disabilities. They also diminish the likelihood that we will treat this population with the level of dignity that the law (and authentic common sense) should demand. ignore the most important question of all -why do we feel the way we do about 'these' people (quotation marks understood)? 44 Decisionmaking in mental disability law cases is inspired by (and reflects) the same kinds of irrational, unconscious, bias-driven stereotypes 45 and prejudices that are exhibited in racist, sexist, homophobic, and religiously and ethnically bigoted decisionmaking. 46 Sanist decisionmaking infects all branches of mental disability law -especially as it relates to questions of criminal law and criminal procedure -and distorts mental disability law jurisprudence. 47 Paradoxically, while sanist decisions are frequently justified as being therapeutically based, sanism customarily results in anti-therapeutic outcomes. 48 Significantly, we tend to ignore, subordinate, or trivialise behavioural research in this area, especially when acknowledging that such research would be cognitively dissonant with our intuitive (albeit empirically flawed) views. 'Sensational media portrayals of mental illness' exacerbate the underlying tensions. We believe that '[m]ental illness can be easily identified by lay persons and matches up closely to popular media depictions.' It is commonly assumed that persons with mental illness cannot be trusted. Common stereotypes about people with mental illness include the beliefs that they are invariably dangerous, unreliable, lazy, responsible for their illness or otherwise blameworthy, faking or exaggerating their condition, or childlike and in need of supervision or care.
1. Mentally ill individuals are 'different,' and, perhaps, less than human. They are erratic, deviant, morally weak, sexually uncontrollable, emotionally unstable, superstitious, lazy, ignorant and demonstrate a primitive morality. They lack the capacity to show love or affection. They smell different from 'normal' individuals, and are somehow worth less.
2. Most mentally ill individuals are dangerous and frightening. They are invariably more dangerous than non-mentally ill persons, and such dangerousness is easily and accurately identified by experts. At best, people with mental disabilities are simple and content, like children. Either parens patriae or police power supply a rationale for the institutionalisation of all such individuals.
3. Mentally ill individuals are presumptively incompetent to participate in 'normal' activities, to make autonomous decisions about their lives (especially in areas involving medical care), and to participate in the political arena.
4. If a person in treatment for mental illness declines to take prescribed antipsychotic medication, that decision is an excellent predictor of (1) future dangerousness, and (2) need for involuntary institutionalisation.
5.
Mental illness can easily be identified by lay persons and matches up closely to popular media depictions. It comports with our common sense notion of crazy behaviour.
6.
It is, and should be, socially acceptable to use pejorative labels to describe and single out people who are mentally ill; this singling out is not problematic in the way that the use of pejorative labels to describe women, blacks, Jews or gays and lesbians might be.
7.
Mentally ill individuals should be segregated in large, distant institutions because their presence threatens the economic and social stability of residential communities.
8.
The mentally disabled person charged with crime is presumptively the most dangerous potential offender, as well as the most morally repugnant one. The insanity defence is used frequently and improperly as a way for such individuals to beat the rap; insanity tests are so lenient that virtually any mentally ill offender gets a free ticket through which to evade criminal and personal responsibility. The insanity defence should be considered only when the mentally ill person demonstrates objective evidence of mental illness.
9.
Mentally disabled individuals simply don't try hard enough. They give in too easily to their basest instincts, and do not exercise appropriate self-restraint. One might optimistically expect, though, that this gloomy picture should be subject to change because of a renewed interest in the integration of social science and law, and greater public awareness of defendants with mental disabilities... One might also expect that litigation and legislation in these areas would draw on social science data in attempting to answer such questions as the actual impact that deinstitutionalisation has had on homelessness, or whether experts can knowledgeably testify about criminal responsibility in so-called 'volitional prong' insanity cases.
If
52
And yet, any attempt to place mental disability law jurisprudence in context results in confrontation with a discordant reality: social science is rarely a coherent influence on mental disability law doctrine. 53 Rather, the legal system selectively -teleologically -either accepts or rejects social science data depending on whether or not the use of that data meets the a priori needs of the legal system. In other words, social science data is privileged when it supports the conclusion the fact finder wishes to reach, but it is subordinated when it questions such a conclusion.
54
As discussed above, these ends are sanist. 
"Infinity Goes Up On Trial": Sanism, Pretextuality, and the Representation ofDefendants with Mental Disabilities V HEURISTICS
Heuristics is a cognitive psychology construct that refers to the implicit thinking devices that individuals use to simplify complex, information-processing tasks, 69 the use of which frequently leads to distorted and systematically erroneous decisions, 70 and causes decision-makers to 'ignore or misuse items of rationally useful information.' 7 1 One single vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colourless data upon which rational choices should be made. 72 Empirical studies reveal jurors' susceptibility to the use of these devices. 7 3 Similarly, legal scholars are notoriously slow to understand the way that the use of these devices affects the way individuals think. 7 4 The use of heuristics 'allows us to wilfully blind ourselves to the 'grey areas' of human behaviour,' 75 and predispose 'people to beliefs that accord with, or are heavily influenced by, their prior experiences.' 76 Experts are similarly susceptible to heuristic biases, 77 specifically the seductive allure of simplifying cognitive devices in their thinking; further, they frequently employ such heuristic gambits as the vividness effect or attribution theory in their testimony. 7 8 Also, biases are more likely to be negative; individuals retain and process negative information as opposed to positive information. 79 Judges' predispositions to employ the same sorts of heuristics as do expert witnesses further contaminate the process.
8 0
By way of example, the vividness heuristic is 'a cognitive-simplifying device through which a 'single vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colourless data upon which rational choices should be made.' 8 1 Through the 'availability' heuristic, we judge the probability or frequency of an event based upon the ease with which we recall it. Through the 'typification' heuristic, we characterise a current experience via reference to past stereotypic behaviour; through the 'attribution' heuristic, we interpret a wide variety of additional information to reinforce pre-
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existing stereotypes. Through the 'hindsight bias,' we exaggerate how easily we could have predicted an event beforehand. Through the 'outcome bias,' we base our evaluation of a decision on our evaluation of an outcome. 82 Through the 'representative heuristic,' we extrapolate overconfidently based upon a small sample size of which they happen to be aware. 83 Through the heuristic of 'confirmation bias,' people tend to favour 'information that confirms their theory over disconfirming information.'
84
It is impossible to understand the thrall in which the media portrayal of criminal defendants has captured the public without understanding the pernicious power of these cognitive-simplifying heuristics.
VI 'ORDINARY COMMON SENSE'
'Ordinary common sense' ('OCS') is a 'powerful unconscious animator of legal decision making.' It is a psychological construct that reflects the level of the disparity between perception and reality that regularly pervades the judiciary in deciding cases involving individuals with mental disabilities .85 OCS is self-referential and non-reflective: 'I see it that way, therefore everyone sees it that way; I see it that way, therefore that's the way it is.' 86 It is supported by our reliance on a series of heuristics-cognitive-simplifying devices that distort our abilities to rationally consider information.
87
The positions frequently taken by former Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas in criminal procedure cases best highlight the power of OCS as an unconscious animator of legal decision-making. 8 8 Such positions frequently demonstrate a total lack of awareness of the underlying psychological issues and focus on such superficial issues as whether a putatively mentally disabled criminal defendant bears a 'normal appearance.' 89
These are not the first jurists to exhibit this sort of closed-mindedness. Trial judges will typically say, 'he (the defendant) doesn't look sick to me,' or, even more revealingly, 'he is as healthy as Reliance on OCS is one of the keys to an understanding of why and how, by way of example, insanity defence jurisprudence has developed. 95 Not only is it prereflexive and self-evident, it is also susceptible to precisely the type of idiosyncratic, reactive decision making that has traditionally typified insanity defence legislation and litigation. Paradoxically, the insanity defence is necessary precisely because it rebuts 'common-sense everyday inferences about the meaning of conduct.'
96
Empirical investigations corroborate the inappropriate application of OCS to insanity defence decision-making. Judges 'unconsciously express public feelings... reflect[ing] community attitudes and biases because they are "close" to the community.' 97 Virtually no members of the public can actually articulate what the substantive insanity defence test is. The public is seriously misinformed about both the 'extensiveness and consequences' of an insanity defence plea. 98 And, the public explicitly and consistently rejects any such defence substantively broader than the 'wild beast' test. 99 Elsewhere, in discussing the insanity defence, I have stated, Not only [are our insanity defence attitudes] 'prereflexive' and 'self-evident,' it is susceptible to precisely the type of idiosyncratic, reactive decisionmaking that has traditionally typified insanity defence legislation and litigation. It also ignores our rich, cultural, heterogenic fabric that makes futile any attempt to establish a unitary level of OCS to govern decisionmaking in an area where 90 Perlin, above n 33, 147. By way of example, the trial judge in the US must seek a competency evaluation if s/he believes there is a 'bona fide' question as to the defendant's incompetency. See eg, Perlin, above n 85, 358-59. Cases are collected in Perlin and Cucolo, above n 1, § 13-1.2.2. 91 Perlin, 'Pretexts and Mental Disability Law', above n 10, a24. 
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we have traditionally been willing to base substantive criminal law doctrine on medieval conceptions of sin, redemption, and religiosity."o
VII As APPLIED IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
This example of the relationship between OCS and the insanity defence is just the tip of the iceberg. I have previously considered just about every aspect of the criminal trial and appellate process from these perspectives, and in each instance, my conclusions are the same: these factors dominate and contaminate the way the criminal trial system works, and it is absolutely essential that those representing criminal defendants 'get this' so as to seek to revere and remediate this behaviour.
Here are some illustrative examples.
Sanism infects incompetency-to-stand-trial jurisprudence in at least four critical ways: (1) courts resolutely adhere to the conviction that defendants regularly malinger and feign incompetency; (2) courts stubbornly refuse to understand the distinction between incompetency to stand trial and insanity, even though the two statuses involve different concepts, different standards, and different points on the 'time line'; (3) courts misunderstand the relationship between incompetency and subsequent commitment, and fail to consider the lack of a necessary connection between postdetermination institutionalisation and appropriate treatment; and (4) courts regularly accept patently inadequate expert testimony in incompetency to stand trial case. * reliance on a fixed vision of popular, concrete, visual images of craziness; * an obsessive fear of feigned mental states; * a presumed absolute linkage between mental illness and dangerousness; * sanctioning of the death penalty in the case of mentally retarded defendants, some defendants who are 'substantially mentally impaired,' or defendants who have been found guilty but mentally ill ('GBMI');
* the incessant confusion and conflation of substantive mental status tests; and * the regularity of sanist appeals by prosecutors in insanity defence summations, arguing that insanity defences are easily faked, that insanity acquittees are often immediately released, and that expert witnesses are readily duped. 104
Also consider how pretextuality relates to the insanity defence:
(T)he fear that defendants will fake the insanity defence to escape punishment continues to paralyze the legal system in spite of an impressive array of empirical evidence that reveals (1) the 100 Perlin, 'Pretexts and Mental Disability Law', above n 10, 29.
101 Perlin, above n 1, 235-36. 102 Perlin, above n 82, 257. 103 Perlin, The Jurisprudence of the Insanity Defense, above n 8, 317.
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minuscule number of such cases, (2) the ease with which trained clinicians are usually able to catch malingering in such cases, (3) the inverse greater likelihood that defendants, even at grave peril to their life, will be more likely to try to convince examiners that they're not crazy, (4) the high risk in pleading the insanity defence (leading to statistically significant greater prison terms meted out to unsuccessful insanity pleaders), and (5) that most successful insanity pleaders remain in maximum security facilities for a far greater length of time than they would have had they been convicted on the underlying criminal indictment. In short, pretextuality dominates insanity defence decisionmaking. The inability of judges to disregard public opinion and inquire into whether defendants have had fair trials is both the root and the cause of pretextuality in insanity defence jurisprudence.os
Sentencing decisions are often pretextual. One example: In the case of a chronically depressed, compulsive gambler under threats of violence to pay off his debts (apparently from organised crime figures), the Sixth Circuit justified its rejection of a downward departure on the grounds that the defendant could have 'just said no.' The court moralised: 'He had the option of reporting the threats he received to the authorities, of course, but he chose instead to engage in serious violations of the law.'
106
And decision-making at the penalty phase of a death penalty trial bespeaks both sanism and pretextuality. 107 Consider, for one notorious example, the improper use of mental disorders as an aggravating factor at the punishment phase; is there any example more vivid than Dr James
Grigson's typical performance as an example of pretextual testimony? 1 08 Elsewhere, I have said this about sanism and the death penalty:
Sanism in the death penalty decision-making process mirrors sanism in the context of insanity defence decision-making. Such decision-making is often irrational, rejecting empiricism, science, psychology, and philosophy, and substituting in its place myth, stereotype, bias, and distortion. It resists educational correction, demands punishment regardless of responsibility, and reifies medievalist concepts based on fixed and absolute notions of good and evil and of right and wrong.
109
And all of this must be contextualised with what we know about how heuristics and OCS similarly contaminate these areas of practice. False OCS drives insanity defence practice; the vividness heuristic leads to death penalty decisions and to incompetency determinations. One example: Research reveals that, in determining the likely future dangerousness of defendants found incompetent to stand trial, and thus in need of institutionalisation, 'expert' evaluations frequently rely not on the examiners' experience or knowledge but on the facts of the act upon which the defendant was originally indicted (a blunder that, of course, ignores the fact that an incompetent defendant may be factually innocent of the underlying charge). 110 Also, the valid and reliable evidence informs us of discrepancies between the criteria actually employed by the examiners, such as seriousness of the crime, and the criteria that the examiners reported as informing their decisions, such as presence of impaired or delusional thinking. Traditional, sporadically-appointed counsel . . . were unwilling to pursue necessary investigations, lacked . . . expertise in mental health problems, and suffered from 'rolelessness', stemming from near total capitulation to experts, hazily defined concepts of success/failure, inability to generate professional or personal interest in the patient's dilemma, and lack of a clear definition of the proper advocacy function. As a result, counsel . . . functioned 'as no more than a clerk, ratifying the events that transpired, rather than influencing them.' 112 The availability of adequate and effective counsel to represent this population -both in criminal and civil matters -is largely illusory; in many jurisdictions, the level of representation remains almost uniformly substandard, and, even within the same jurisdiction, the provision of counsel can be 'wildly inconsistent. ' One of the most important legal theoretical developments of the past two decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of therapeutic jurisprudence ('TJ'). 116 Therapeutic jurisprudence 
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What 'the three Vs' commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant's story, the litigant feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very process that engendered the end result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved behaviour in the future. In general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are making, or at least participating in, their own decisions. 127
A The Significance of Dignity 1 2 8
It is also necessary to focus more closely on TJ's commitment to dignity, and to consider the meaning of dignity in the legal process. 129 Treating people with dignity and respect makes them more likely to view procedures as fair and the motives behind law enforcement's actions as wellmeaning. 130 What individuals want most 'is a process that allows them to participate, seeks to merit their trust, and treats them with dignity and respect.' 13 1 The right to dignity is memorialised in many state constitutions, 132 in multiple international human rights documents, 133 and in judicial opinions. 134 It is important to note that, in several landmark decisions, the US Supreme Court has struck down both criminal and civil statutes that humiliate and shame. 135 With these cases, the Court has acknowledged the importance of the role of dignity. 136 Elsewhere, the Court has specifically recognised the shame that can result when dignity is not present. In Indiana v Edwards, the Court held that 'a right of self-representation at trial will not 'affirm the dignity' of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defence without the assistance of counsel.' 137 The Court stated that 'to the contrary, given that defendant's uncertain mental state, the spectacle that could well written about how the current insanity acquittee retention system and the entire incompetency system violate basic TJ tenets. 14 0 Let me consider these issues in more depth solely from the perspective of the insanity defence to make my points more clearly.
I have been critical (and remain critical) of the ways that insanity acquittee release/ recommitment hearings have been conducted (on issues ranging from the lack of adequate counsel to the perfunctory ways judges treat these matters to the sanism and pretextuality reflected in the positions of prosecutors in their efforts to oppose lessening of restraints or changes of conditions of confinement or release 
